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SOME EXAMPLES OF USING THE LEGAL
RELATIONS LANGUAGE IN THE LEGAL
DOMAIN: APPLIED DEONTIC LOGIC
Layman E. Allen*
The fundamental concept of the LEGAL RELATIONS Language (LRL) is
the recursively-defined notion of LEGAL RELATION (LR). As LR is de-
fined here, there is an infinite number of different LEGAL RELATIONS,
and LRL is a language for precisely and completely describing each of those
infinite number of dfferent LEGAL RELATIONS. With its robust collec-
tion of dfferent names, one for each of the different LEGAL RELATIONS,
LRL provides adequate vocabulary for (1) describing every possible legal state
of affairs, (2) accounting for every possible change from one legal state of
affairs to another, (3) representing every possible legal rule, and (4) repre-
senting every possible legal argument. There are presented here some illustra-
tions of how LRL can be used by lawyers, law students, judges, and expert
system-builders to demonstrate how the systems crafted by deontic logicians
can be applied in the legal domain.
I. LI-TRODUGTION
The infinite number of different LEGAL RELATIONS that can
be expressed in the LEGAL RELATIONS Language (LRL) give LRL
extraordinary expressive capability. It not only fulfills Hohfeld's
dream of achieving the "lowest common denominators" of legal dis-
course capable of (1) describing every possible legal state of affairs,
and (2) accounting for every change in every legal state of affairs,' but
LRL can also be used (3) to represent every possible legal set of rules
and (4) to represent every possible legal argument. This is a claim
about LRL's expressive capability that is not susceptible to logical
proof but which can easily be disconfirmed with a single counter-ex-
ample. I have been challenging colleagues and students since the late
* Professor of Law and and Research Scientist, University of Michigan Law
School; Iaymanal@umich.edu.
1 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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1950s to provide a counter-example of (1) or (2) to a fragment of LRL
that is an extension of Hohfeld's fundamental legal conceptions; not a
single counter-example has yet been identified. It is my current belief
that the present version of LRL is complete in all four senses above.
2
The terms from LRL most significant for the examples of legal
application of LRL in this article are DUTY, POWER, and CONDI-
TIONAL. Each of these is an operator in a LEGAL RELATION (LR)
in LRL.
"DUTY(s,pl,p2)" is an abbreviation for a statement that expresses
the DUTY that state of affairss be brought about for the benefit of
personAl by person_2, that is: Person_2 has a DUTY to person-1 to see
to it that state-of affairss is so. More briefly:
DUTY(s,pl,p2) =ab Person_2 has a DUTY to person_1 to see to it
that state-of affairss is so.
"POWER(D2 (x,p),LR)" is an abbreviation for a statement that ex-
presses the POWER of person-p (by exercising it) to create
LEGALRELATIONLR, that is:
POWER(D2(x,p)) =ab Person-p has POWER (by exercising it) to
create LEGALRELATIONLR.
2 Candidates that are thought to be counter-examples with respect to any of the
four senses that may point to needed extensions of LRL are cordially invited to the
following Intemet site: http://thinkers.law.umich.edu/lfiles/LRL.
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"CONDITIONAL(c,LR)" is an abbreviation for a statement that
expresses the CONDITIONALLEGALRELATIONLR such that IF
condition_c is fulfilled, LEGAL_RELATIONLR is created, that is:
CONDITIONAL(c,LR) =ab IF conditionc is fulfilled,
LEGALRELATIONLR is created.
"LEGAL RELATION" is defined contextually in a recursive
definition:
(1) DUTY-type propositions are LEGAL RELATIONS.
(2) a. Equivalents and NEGATIONS of LEGAL RELATIONS are
LEGAL RELATIONS
b. IF LR is a LEGAL RELATION and POWER(D2 (x,p) ,LR) is a
POWER-type proposition that indicates that LR will be cre-
ated when person-p exercises that POWER, THEN
POWER(D2(x,p),LR) is a LEGAL RELATION.
c. IF LR is a LEGAL RELATION and CONDITIONAL(c,LR) is
a proposition that indicates that LR will be created upon ful-
fillment of some specified condition_c, THEN CONDI-
TIONAL(c,LR) is a LEGAL RELATION.
(3) IF a proposition is NOT a LEGAL RELATION by virtue of (1)
or (2), THEN it is NOT a LEGAL RELATION.
The purpose of this article is not to further describe LRL,3 nor to
further extend it or its underlying logic, which includes a relevance
propositional logic along with alethic, deontic, action, and quantifier
logics. 4 Rather, here there are furnished some examples of the use of
3 LRL has been sufficiently described elsewhere. See Layman E. Allen, Enriching
the Deontic Fundamental Legal Conceptions of Hohfeld, in ANNIvERSARY ANTHOLOGY IN
COMPUTERS AND LAw (Jon Bing & 0. Torvund eds., forthcoming 1998); Layman E.
Allen, From the Fundamental Legal Conceptions of Hohfeld to LEGAL RELATIONS: Refining
the Enrichment of Solely Deontic LEGAL RELATIONS, in DEONTIC LOGIC, AGENCY AND
NoRMATIVE SYSTEMS 1 (Mark A. Brown & Jose Carmo eds., 1996); Layman E. Allen,
Towards a Normalized Language to Clarify the Structure of Legal Discourse, in DEONTIC
LOGIC, COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS AND LEGAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 349 (Antonio
A. Martino ed., 1982); Layman E. Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting
& Interpreting, 66 YALE L.J. 833 (1957); Layman E. Allen, Achieving Ruency in Modern-
ized and Formalized Hohfeld: Puzzles and Games for the LEGAL RELATIONS Language, Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law,
June 30-July 3, 1997, University of Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, Australia; Lay-
man E. Allen & Charles S. Saxon, Better Language, Better Thought, Better Communication:
The A-HOHPELD Language for Legal Analysis, Proceedings of the Fifth International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, May 21-24, 1995, University of Mary-
land, College Park, Maryland.
4 See Layman E. Allen & Charles S. Saxon, Analysis of the Logical Structure of Legal
Rules by a Modernized and Formalized Version of Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions, in
AUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF LEGAL TEXTS: LOGIC, INFORMATIcs, LAw 385 (Antonio A. Mar-
tino & Fiorenza Socci Natali eds., 1986); Layman E. Allen & Charles S. Saxon, A-
1998]
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LRL in law that address the interests of deontic logicians about the
application of their craft in the legal domain. What is presented be-
low illustrates the uses of the LEGAL RELATIONS Language (the full
current version of which is presented in Appendix A):
1. as a study aid to law students in generating "lean" pictorial briefs
of, as well as facilitating deeper analysis of, appellate case
opinions;
2. as a representation language for legal expert system builders to
use in constructing MINT (Multiple INTerpretation-assistance
systems) for helping those who toil in the legal vineyards to bet-
ter deal with problems of structural ambiguity
(a) by assisting interpreters of existing legal rules to detect struc-
tural ambiguities in their expression, and
(b) by assisting drafters of new legal rules to eliminate inadver-
tent structural ambiguities and to assure that any structural
ambiguities that are included are there deliberately;
3. as a tool for practicing attorneys
(a) to analyze the expression of the logical structure of legal
rules with the aim of ferreting out alternative structural in-
terpretations of the rules,
(b) to describe the outcomes of, as well as the arguments ad-
vanced in, appellate court opinions in a more precise and
complete language that facilitates a clearer portrayal of the
issues involved and a deeper analysis of their resolution, and
(c) to adapt relevant existing MINT systems to become individu-
alized practice systems for their own specialized practice, co-
ordinating relevant rules, cases, and literature;
4. as an intellectual aid for appellate court judges to use in crafting
written opinions that precisely and completely express the struc-
ture, scope, and limits of their decisions.
The MINT system for § 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) of the Freedom of In-
formation Act5 (FOIA) presented in Part II will illustrate 2 (a), 2(b),
and 3(a). Following that, in Part III the analysis of Larson v. CIA6 is
the first effort at a pictorial "lean" brief to illustrate 1, which, in turn,
combines with the MINT system generated to illustrate 3(c). In the
Hohfeld: A Language for Robust Structural Representation of Knowledge in the Legal Domain
to Build Interpretation-Assistance Expert Systems, in DEONTIc Locac IN COMPUTER SCIENCE:
NORMATIVE SYSTEM SPECIFICATION 205 (John-Jules Ch. Meyer et al. eds., 1991); Lay-
man E. Allen, Formalizing Hohfeldian Analysis to Clarify the Multiple Senses of 'Legal Right.
A Powerful Lens for the Electronic Age, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 428 (1974).
5 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (A) (iii) (1994).
6 843 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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concluding part, there is a more lengthy consideration of James Baird
Co. v. Gimbel Bros.7 to illustrate 3 (b) and 4.
II. A MINT SYSTEM FOR FOIA § 552 (A) (4) (A) (m)
The MINT system is a set of computer programs that, from an
input file constructed by a builder of MINT systems from the present
text of a set of legal rules, will generate a MINT system for those rules,
which, in response to user resolution of structural ambiguities speci-
fied in the constructed input file, will generate alternative interpreta-
tion-assistance expert systems of those rules for application to user-
defined legal problem situations. The most difficult and important
task of such a system builder is to detect and specify the structural
ambiguities that occur in the present text of the rules, and it is with
respect to this task that LRL plays a crucial role.
A. Present Version of FOIA § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)
The relevant part of the present text of § 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) of the
Freedom of Information Act is the following:
Documents shall be furnished without any charge or at a charge re-
duced... if disclosure of the information is in the public interest
because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding
of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily
in the commercial interest of the requester.
8
B. Seven Structural Ambiguities in the Present Version
There are at least seven structural ambiguities in the text of the
section above. Three of them have to do with the scope of reference
of the terms "and," "because," and "or," and the other four have to do
with substantive content of the terms "if," "because," "shall," and the
negative of "shall."
Question 1: Interpretation of the Scope of Reference of "And"
In determining the scope of the "and," it is clear that the present
text of the section is elliptical for (with the parts left out shown in
corner brackets) the following elaborated statement:
<(a)> Documents shall be furnished without any charge or at a
charge reduced... if<(b)>disclosure of the information is in the
public interest because <(c)> it is likely to contribute significantly to
7 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
8 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) (emphasis added).
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public understanding of the operations or activities of the govern-
ment and <(d)> [it] is not primarily in the commercial interest of
the requester.
9
In the most appropriate interpretation of the scope of reference
of the term "and" in the above statement, which of the following
should the elaborated statement be interpreted as asserting: A or B?
A) (a) if (b) because [(c) and (d)] ESupportlA
B) [(a) if (b) because (c)] and [(a) if (d)].
When a user engages in the structural interview in the MINT sys-
tem and is answering this question the "ESupportlA" entry to the
right of alternative A indicates a hypertext link to information that
supports choosing this alternative. Clicking on this entry might lead
to text like the following:
1. The omission of the "it" after the "and" to include (c) and (d)
((d) without the "it") in one sentence can be interpreted as the
drafter's signaling that (d) is meant to have a close relationship
to (c) as in A, and not the distant relationship indicated by B.
The omitted 'it' should raise a refutable presumption that A is
the most appropriate interpretation, subject to someone's show-
ing that the policy being pursued in this provision is better
served by another interpretation.
Question 2: Interpretation of the Reference of "If"
The elaborated statement clearly asserts at least the following
conditional statement:
IF (b) because (c) and (d), THEN (a).
In the most appropriate interpretation of the reference of the
term "if" in the elaborated statement above, does it express a single
conditional or a biconditional? Which of the following should the
statement be interpreted as asserting: A or B?
A) "." (Just a period and nothing more. The overall statement
does not assert anything more than the conditional statement
above.)
B) ", BUT OTHERWISE, in the circumstances where the antece-





Question 3: Interpretation of the Scope of Reference of "Because"
In the most appropriate interpretation of the reference of the
term "because" in the elaborated statement above, does it refer only to
(c) or does it refer to both (c) and (d)? Which of the following
should the statement be interpreted as asserting: A or B?
A) (a) if (1) (b) because (c) and (2) (d).
B) (a) if (b) because (1) (c) and (2) (d).
Question 4: Interpretation of the Reference of "Because"
Consider the occurrence of the term "because" in the "(b) be-
cause (c) and (d)" part of the elaborated statement above. In the
most appropriate interpretation of the reference of the term "be-
cause" in this part, which of the following should the part be inter-
preted as asserting: A or B or C?
A) (b) AND (c) AND (d).
B) (b) AND (c) AND (d) AND IF (c) AND (d) THEN (b).
C) (c) AND (d) AND IF (c) AND (d) THEN (b).
Question 5: Interpretation of the Scope of Reference of "Or"
Consider the occurrence of the term "or" in the (c) part of the
elaborated statement above, that is, the sentence:
[I]t is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of
the operations or activities of the government.
Clearly, this sentence is elliptical for a disjunction comprised of
the sentence "it is likely to contribute significantly to public under-
standing of the operations of the government" with a second sentence
about the activities of the government. In the most appropriate inter-
pretation of the reference of the term "or" in this part, which of the
following should that second sentence be interpreted as expressing: A
or B or C?
A) It is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of
the activities of the government.
B) It is likely to contribute significantly to publid activities of the
government.
C) It is likely to contribute significantly to activities of the
government.
Question 6: Interpretation of the Reference of "Shall"
Consider the occurrence of the term "shall" in the (a) part of the
elaborated statement above, that is, the sentence:
1998]
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Documents shall be furnished without any charge or at a charge re-
duced ....
This passive voice version of the conclusion specifies neither who
shall do the furnishing nor to whom. If both parties to the transaction
are specified, the alternative structural interpretations are articulated
in DUTY terms, but if only the party doing the furnishing is specified,
the alternatives are stated in terms of what that party MUST do, leav-
ing unsaid for the benefit of whom. The latter option is pursued here.
In the most appropriate interpretation of "shall," which should
(a) be interpreted as asserting: A or B or C or D?
A) The agency furnishes the documents without charge or at a
charge reduced.
B) The agency MUST furnish the documents without charge or at a
charge reduced.
C) The agency has POWER to furnish the documents without
charge or at a charge reduced and MUST exercise that POWER.
D) The agency has POWER to furnish the documents without
charge or at a charge reduced and MAY, BUT NEED NOT, ex-
ercise that POWER.
Question 7: Interpretation of the Reference of Negative of "Shall"
There are two possible negatives of ". . . shall . . ."-namely:
(1) "it is not so that ... shall ... " and
(2) " . . . shall not ... ."
So, consider first the interpretation of the words "it is not so
that ... shall" in the following statement:
It is not so that documents shall be furnished without charge or at a
charge reduced.
Consider next the interpretation of the words "shall not" in the
following statement:
Documents shall not be furnished without charge or at a charge
reduced.
Choose which of the above two statements is most appropriately
regarded in this context as the negative of sentence (a) and then spec-
ify in the most appropriate interpretation of the words "it is not so
that.. . shall" and the words "shall not," which of the following the
negative of (a) should be interpreted as asserting:
A) IT IS NOT SO THAT documents are furnished without charge
or at a charge reduced.
B) Documents MUST NOT be furnished without charge or at a
charge reduced.
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C) The government agency has POWER to furnish documents with-
out charge or at a charge reduced and MUST NOT exercise that
POWER.
D) The government agency has POWER to furnish documents
without charge or at a charge reduced and MAY, but NEED
NOT, exercise that POWER
E) Documents MAY, but NEED NOT, be furnished without charge
or at a charge reduced.
F) The government agency lacks POWER to furnish documents
without charge or at a charge reduced and MUST NOT engage
in action that would exercise such POWER were the agency to
have such POWER.
G) The government agency lacks POWER to furnish documents
without charge or at a charge reduced and MAY, but NEED
NOT, engage in action that would exercise such POWER were
the agency to have such POWER
For each of these questions there is a residual "other" alternative
response which the user can add to the list. This is used to detect
alternatives that the system builder may have bverlooked. Given the
number of alternative responses for each question, if all of the re-
sponses to all of the questions were independent of each other, there
would be a total of 2x2x2x3x3x4x7 = 2016 different structural inter-
pretations of § 552(a) (A) (4) (iii). But the many dependencies reduce
the actual number for this set of seven questions to 210 different
interpretations.
C. Determination of Structural Interpretations
Specific structural interpretations of the set of rules expressed by
this provision are determined by the responses that users give to the
above seven structural questions specified in the MINT input file.
The following is the structural interpretation determined by the
MINT system for § 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) for the ABBCCC responses to
the six of the seven questions that are asked for this pattern of
responses.
1. Clear Normalized Version of Interpretation ABBCCC
IF
1. all other relevant conditions are fulfilled for the application of
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A. disclosure of the information is in the public interest because
it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding
of the operations or activities of the government, AND
B. disclosure of the information is in the public interest because
it is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester,
AND
C. IF
1. disclosure of the information is in the public interest be-
cause it is likely to contribute significantly to public under-
standing of the operations or activities of the government,
AND
2. disclosure of the information is in the public interest be-
cause it is not primarily in the commercial interest of the
requester, THEN
3. disclosure of the information is in the public interest,
THEN
D. the government agency has POWER to furnish documents
without charge or at a charge reduced and MUST exercise
that POWER,
BUT OTHERWISE,
E. the government agency lacks POWER to furnish documents
without charge or at a charge reduced and MUST NOT en-
gage in action that would exercise such POWER were the
agency to have such POWER,
BUT OTHERWISE,
3. Section 552(a) (4) (A) (iii) of the Freedom of Information Act is not
applicable in this situation.
The MINT system also automatically generates an arrow diagram
picture of this interpretation:
2. Clear Arrow Diagram of Interpretation ABBCCC
>-univ con- > >-bcl-bc2-(>-bcl-bc2->bl)- > woal
0
----> n-apply
The arrow diagram shows the structure of this interpretation with
its sentence constituents abbreviated by alpha-numeric names. The
universal set of triggering conditions that is incorporated into every
MINT-determined interpretation is abbreviated by "univ con." It rep-
resents the sentence here: "All other relevant conditions are fulfilled




With these normalized versions of an interpretation of a set of
legal rules, a user could relate her situation to the normalized version
to determine how § 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) applies to the situation. Alter-
natively, she can engage in a situational interview with the MINT sys-
tem for this provision, and the system will provide her with a summary
of the results that occur with respect to this interpretation and the
reasons for each result.
In this manner LRL is usable as a representation language by
MINT system builders (2a) to help interpreters detect structural ambi-
guities in the expression of legal rules, (2b) to help drafters to elimi-
nate inadvertent structural ambiguities, and (3a) to help lawyers
analyze the structure of rules and discern alternative structural inter-
pretations of them. Larson v. CA in the next part provides opportu-
nity (3c) to show how law firms specializing in areas of law can build
their own specially-tailored practice systems, as well as (1) to present
the first example ever of a lean brief for use by law students.
III. A LF-AN BRIEF OF LRSON v. CA 10
In this case, Larson filed a complaint in federal district court on
the CIA's denial of his request for waiver of fees under
§ 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) for information he requested from the CIA. The
district court granted the CIA's motion for summary judgment, and
the decision was affirmed on appeal.1' As a relatively simple case in-
volving statutory interpretation of the FOA provision for which a
MINT system has been built, the Larson case is a good candidate both
(1) to construct a lean brief of and (2) to illustrate how information
from different sources can be coordinated in a specialized individual
practice system.
A. A Complete LEGAL RELATIONS Brief of Larson
In order to do a lean brief of any case, the analyst must under-
stand the complete brief that the lean brief is abbreviating. A com-
plete brief of Larson in LEGAL RELATIONS terms is shown below in
Figure 1, in which the occurrence of events in time is shown horizon-
tally from left to right and the changes in LEGAL RELATIONS that
result from each occurrence are indicated vertically from top to
bottom.
The complete brief begins with a chronological event-by-event de-
scription of the precipitating events that led to the litigation and a
10 843 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
11 Id. at 1482.
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pictorial representation of them. That is followed by a picture of the
legal state of affairs in LEGAL RELATIONS terms at each point in
time that an event occurs. At the outset Larson has DISCRETION-
ARYPOWER_1 to request that information be provided to him by the
CIA, which he exercises to create OBLIGATORYPOWER_2 of the
CIA to decide whether or not to transfer legal possession of the re-
quested documents and DISCRETIONARYPOWER_4 of the CIA to
request payment for furnishing the documents requested and to au-
thorize Larson to request waiver of such payment. The CIA exercises
both of these POWERs: the first by giving Larson some of the docu-
ments to create for Larson the bundle-of LEGALRELATIONS_3
that constitute legal possession, and the second by requesting Larson
to assure payment for the remaining documents to create DISCRE-
TIONARYPOWER_5 of Larson to commit to pay and DISCRETION-
ARYPOWER_7 of Larson to request waiver of fees. 12 Ordinarily, the
exercise of a POWER terminates it; that is what happens to POWER_2
and POWER_3. However, it is unclear with respect to POWERI
whether Larson's request terminates his POWER to make further re-
quests for the same material, but a decision on that was not required
for purposes of this case. Larson then exercises his POWER_2 (termi-
nating it) for waiver of the fees, creating OBLIGATORYPOWER_8 of
the CIA to decide on the waiver. The CIA complies by exercising
POWER_8 to create an agency-determined lack of DUTY_9 of the CIA
to furnish the documents free or at reduced charge.13 It is this deci-
sion of the CIA that Larson litigates unsuccessfully in district court
and fails similarly on appeal to the circuit court of appeals.
14
In a complete LEGAL RELATIONS brief of Larson, there would
be in addition to the pictorial account of the dispute shown in Figure
1 both (1) a pictorial account of the losing party's argument(s), and
Figure 1. Graphic Representation of LEGAL RELATIONS Analysis of Court's Decision
Larson v. CJ.1A, 843 F2d 1481 (Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, 1988)
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(2) a LEGAL RELATIONS account of the court's decision about the
dispute resulting from the precipitating events.
The pictorial account of Larson's argument would be identical to
Figure 1 except for the final determination made by the CIA in exer-
cise of its POWER_8. Instead of determining that there was a lack of
DUTY by the CIA to Larson to furnish the information free, he argued
that it should have determined that there was such a DUTY, that is:
Figure l. Graphic Representation of Larson's Argument that the CIA Should Exercise its Obligatory
Power to Create Its DUTY to Furnish the Information Free or at Reduced Cost
a o e a POw~Eo(C19."9) HE
POWER C'S POWER to decide on waiver request --
C - >X OsOGATORY POWER of C to create (9) or
0/H9 I co0i0 e (H9)
H9
A9 D UY(s9. L. C) A9
Mrfs C' Agecy-de erined Dwn to
09 L c L to disclose free or at reduced charge
The LEGAL RELATIONS account of the court's decision is the
following:
When
(a) Larson requests information from the CIA under FOIA, he ex-
ercises (1) his DISCRETIONARY POWER to make an official
request for such information, thereby creating LEGAL RELA-
TIONS LR_2 and LR_3, namely:
(2) DISCRETIONARY POWER of the CIA to request commit-
ment by Larson to pay for additional information beyond
the biographical data requested, and
(3) OBLIGATORY POWER of the CIA to decide whether or
not to create LEGAL POSSESSION (a bundle of LEGAL
RELATIONS) by Larson of the biographical data requested
by him.
When
(b) the CIA supplies the requested biography and requests commit-
ment from Larson to pay for future information to be fur-
nished, the CIA
A. exercises its POWER3 to grant Larson LEGAL POSSES-
SION of the biographical information furnished, thereby
creating LR_4, namely:
(4) the bundle of LEGAL RELATIONS with respect to the
information furnished that constitute LEGAL POSSES-
SION by Larson, and
B. exercises its POWER_2 to request payment commitment,
thereby creating LR_5 and LR_7, namely:
(5) Larson's DISCRETIONARY POWER to make commit-
ment to pay for such information, and
(7) Larson's DISCRETIONARY POWER to request waiver




(c) Larson requests waiver of the fee for the remainder of the infor-
mation, he exercises his DISCRETIONARY POWER to request
waiver of the charges for providing such information, thereby
creating LR_8, namely.
(8) OBLIGATORY POWER of the CIA to decide whether or
not to grant the request for waiver of payment of the fee for
providing the additional information.
When
(d) the CIA denies the request for waiver of the charges by finding
that providing the requested information would not result in
substantial benefit to the public, it exercises its POWER to
grant or deny the request, thereby creating LR_9, namely:
(9) an official agency-determined lack of DUTY of the CIA to
Larson to furnish the requested information free or at a
reduced charge.
In order for a law student to do such a complete brief of a case
such as the one above in her mind, rather than writing it out on paper,
she must be fluent in the LEGAL RELATIONS Language. So
equipped, after reading the case opinion she will be ready to concisely
and precisely summarize it with a lean brief picture.
B. The Lean Brief Derived from the Complete Brief
In preparation for writing the lean brief, the law student draws a
circle in the margin beside the text of the case opinion that describes
each event that is potentially legally significant. After completing the
first reading of the case, she goes back and inserts lower-case letters
alphabetically in the circles in chronological order to clearly mark the
order of the sequence of events in the case. She then is ready to con-
struct in her mind and write out the following lean brief of Larson as
shown below in Figure 2.
That is it-a complete and precise account of the court's deci-
sion. It can be done readily by the fluent student who has achieved a
full understanding of the case by reading it. For those who are fluent
in LRL and know how to build and understand a lean brief, it is a
handy form for reviewing the case and for comparing it with other
cases. Even more important, a significant aspect of the case that
might easily pass unnoticed is glaringly apparent in the lean brief. Or-
dinarily, the precipitating and litigating events are clearly separated in
time and, thus, can be presented in a single row. In this case, they
overlapped with events (e) and (h) being "out of order" in order for
the litigating events to all be subsequent in time to the events that
precipitated the litigation. The legal effect of this overlap is that the
1998]
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Figure 2. A Lean Brief In LEGAL RELATIONS: Larson v. C.I.A, 843 F2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
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plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies before going
to the district court. Thus, the following single sentence in Footnote 3
of the court of appeals opinion would have been sufficient to dispose
of this case: "Larson had failed to exhaust his administrative reme-
dies."15 That he went to court before seeking appeal within the CIA
stands out in the temporal sequence so clearly displayed in the lean
brief. The CIA's treating the filing of the complaint in the district
court as an appeal within the CIA and their ruling on it, and the court
of appeals' analysis of the application of § 552(a) (4) (A) (iii) to this
dispute as though the appeal had been timely made are actions by the
CIA and the court that would not have been necessary for achieving
the result of this case. The affirmation of the district court'sjudgment
to deny Larson's complaint could have been justified on the grounds
of Larson's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The CIA's
processing of the complaint as an appeal and the court of appeals'
detailed analysis were probably done to get and furnish some clarifica-
tion of application of § 552(a) (4) (A) (iii) to such requests to provide
guidance to other agencies and requesters.
As users become fluent in analyzing and constructing the LEGAL
RELATIONS Diagrams, the explanatory text to the right of the dia-
15 Id. at 1482 n.3.
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gram in Figure 2 can be omitted; such text (and perhaps other parts)
will then be redundant.
C. Coordinating Rules and Cases and Other Literature
(within MINT Systems)
The court of appeals' analysis of the application of
§ 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) to Larson's request furnishes evidence of at least
one aspect of this court's structural interpretation of the section. In
this respect it helps to resolve the ambiguity addressed in Question 1
of the MINT system built for this section above. The court does not
address the ambiguity explicitly in its analysis, but it is clear that the
court is presuming that the appropriate response to Question I is al-
ternative A. The court clearly assumes that the requirement of contri-
bution to public understanding and the requirement for lack of
commercial interest must both be satisfied for the requester to qualify
for the fee waiver; neither alone will be sufficient. Thus, the following
would be made as Entry 2 to ESupportlA of Question 1 in the
§ 552 (a) (4) (A) (iii) MINT system structural interview:
2. In Larson v. CIA, the court proceeded on the assumption that
Alternative A is the appropriate response to this question. The
court states the following:
To guide agencies in their determinations as to whether the re-
quester has met the burden, the new fee waiver test provides a
two-pronged analysis. One prong demands that the requester
not have a commercial interest in the disclosure of the informa-
tion sought. The other prong of the test requires that the disclo-
sure of the information be "likely to contribute significantly to
public understanding of the operations or activities of the gov-
ernment." Concededly, nothing in the record indicates that Lar-
son had a commercial interest in obtaining information about
Yurchenko and his defections. Therefore, Larson satisfies the
first prong of the new test. Thus, the second prong becomes the
dispositive factor in this case.16
This illustrates how cases are coordinated with rules. Information
presented in case opinions that is related to any of the alternatives or
any of the terminology used in structural questions about legal rules is
explicitly linked to those alternatives and terminology by hypertext
links. There are provisions for similar links between the terminology
used in situational questions and the information presented in cases,
and there are similar provisions for linking other legal literature to
cases and rules by such links to them. This is how law firms can accu-
16 Id. at 1483 (citations omitted).
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mulate relevant rules, cases, and literature in their own specifically-
tailored practice systems.
Such lean brief pictures of the LEGAL RELATIONS analysis of
disputes in legal transactions can be useful, not only to law students,
but to lawyers and judges as well, as is illustrated in the next section.
IV. A LEGAL RELATIONS ANALysis OFJAMfwi BAiRD Co. v. GzXmBEL
BROS., INC.
One of the landmark decisions in American contract law gov-
erning the relations between general contractors and subcontractors
is the case of James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., InC., 17 in which the plain-
tiff-general contractor unsuccessfully sued the defendant-subcontrac-
tor for damages suffered on an alleged breach of contract. A
complete LEGAL RELATIONS description and analysis of the opin-
ion of Judge Learned Hand, one of the nation's most distinguished
jurists, is presented below, along with lean brief pictures of the plain-
tiff's unsuccessful arguments.
In the LR analysis of the court's decision that follows, only event
b, event c, event d, and event f are legally significant; the other events
are given no legal effect in the decision of the court-despite defend-
ant's losing arguments to the contrary.
Everything that occurs after Baird receives the telegram revoking
the offer is of null legal effect for purposes of the dispute in this case.
It mattered not for the Baird-Gimbel dispute that Baird submitted a
bid to the Highway Department, which was accepted, nor that Baird
subsequently explicitly communicated acceptance of the Gimbel of-
fer.18 The court's decision is summarized below in the LR analysis of
Figure 3.
When
(b) Gimbel posted the letter to Baird and others offering to sell
linoleum at mistakenly low prices, it exercised its DISCRE-
TIONARY POWER_1 to make offers, thereby creating CLR_2,
namely:
(2) CONDITIONAL LEGAL RELATION (condition upon ful-
fillment of condition c2) LR_3 and LR_4, namely: (3)
Baird's POWER_3 to accept and (4) Gimbel's POWER_4 to
make a conditional revocation
When
(c) Baird received the letter from Gimbel the condition c2 was ful-
filled, thereby creating LR_3 and LR_4.
17 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
18 Id. at 345.
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Figure 3. Graphic Representation of LEGAL RELATIONS Analysis of Court's Decision
BAIRD v. GIMBEI, 64 F.d 344 (CCA-2 1933)
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When
(d) Gimbel sent the telegram withdrawing the offers at the mis-
taken prices, it exercised its POWER.4, thereby creating
CLR_5, a conditional revocation of Baird's POWER_3 to
accept.
When
(f) Baird received the telegram withdrawing the offer, condition_c5
of CLR_5 was fulfilled, thereby terminating Baird's POWER_3
to accept, which meant that Baird's subsequent effort to accept
had no legal effect.
The crucial part of Judge Hand's opinion, as represented above
in the LEGAL RELATIONS language, is the determination that it is
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POWERIA that was exercised by the letter Gimbel sent offering to
sell linoleum (event b). The losing arguments offered by Baird treat
event b as the exercise of different kinds of POWERS to offer, and
they are represented by different pictures. The exercise of the
POWERIA of the court's decision resulted in CLR_2, the fulfillment
of whose condition results in the creation of LR_3 and LR_4.
It is a different POWER to offer, namely POWERIB that is exer-
cised in the argument that Baird's submission operates as an accept-
ance of Gimbel's bid. When POWERIB is exercised, it leads to a
CONDITIONAL LEGAL RELATION 2B whose fulfillment results in
creation of LR_3, LR_4, and LR_9, where LR_9 is a POWER of Baird
to make a conditional acceptance. The exercise of POWER_9 creates
POWER_10 in the Highway Department to create a CONDITIONAL
DUTY of Gimbel to deliver the linoleum to Baird at the quoted prices.
The exercise of POWER_10 creates CLR_6, whose condition c6 is ful-
filled when time for performance arrives, creating Gimbel's DUTY to
deliver to Baird. Gimbel's refusal to deliver violates its DUTY to Baird
to do so and creates a remedial DUTY to pay damages. The lean brief
picture of this argument is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. LEGAL RELATIONS Analysis of Argument of Submission of Bid as Acceptance
Changes in Legal States of Affairs
States Prior to Events that Precipitated the Dispute Statet After1hose Eveats
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[I]t seems entirely clear that the contractors did not suppose that
they accepted the offer merely by putting in their bids. If, for exam-
ple, the successful one had repudiated the contract with the public
authorities after it had been awarded to him, certainly the defend-
ant could not have sued him for a breach. If he had become bank-
rupt, the defendant could not prove against his estate. It seems
plain therefore that there was no contract between them.19
Figure 5. LEGALRELATIONSAuaysls of Estoppel Argument
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What might have motivated this rejection is that acceptance of
this argument. would have put Gimbel in the position of having a
DUTY to deliver to Baird at the quoted prices, leaving Baird not
bound to buy from Gimbel but free to shop around to other suppliers
for lower prices. Baird's estoppel argument suffered a similar de-
fect-and fate.
The second unsuccessful argument made by Baird is that Gimbel
was bound to deliver under the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
avoid the harsh results of allowing the promisor to repudiate, when
the promissee has acted in reliance upon the offer. There is involved
in the estoppel argument yet a third POWER to offer, POWER_1G.
19 Id. at 346.
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The exercise of POWERiC creates CONDITIONAL LR_2C whose
fulfillment creates LR_3, LR 4, and LR_1 1. When POWER_4 is exer-
cised, Baird's POWER of acceptance, POWER_3, is conditionally re-
voked, thereby creating CONDITIONAL LR_5 whose fulfillment
recreates LR_IC and terminates LR_3 and LR_12. When Baird sub-
mits the bid to the Highway Department, its POWER_11 is exercised,
(1) modifying the conditions necessary for fulfillment of CONDI-
TIONAL LR_5 to include rejection of its bid by the Highway Depart-
ment as well as receipt of the telegram from Gimbel revoking the
offer, and (2) creating POWER_12 of the Highway Department's
POWER to terminate Gimbel's conditional revocation by accepting
Baird's bid. When the Highway Department exercises POWERI2 by
accepting Baird's bid, the conditional revocation, CLR_5 is termi-
nated, so that despite the arrival of the telegram (event f) and letter
(event h) withdrawing the offer, POWER_3 is left intact until Baird
exercises it by accepting Gimbel's offer (event i). The lean brief pic-
ture of this LEGAL RELATIONS analysis is shown below in Figure 5.
But this argument did not pass muster with Judge Hand either
since its result would also have Gimbel bound (to keep the offer
open) and Baird free (to reject the offer) until Baird's POWER_3 of
acceptance was exercised.
The final unsuccessful argument characterized Gimbel's letter as
an offer for an option to Baird that could be conditionally accepted by
submitting a bid to the Highway Department; the posting of the letter
being an exercise of POWERID, creating CLR_2D. When CRL_2D is
fulfilled by the arrival of the letter, POWER_3, POWER_4, and
POWER_13 are created. Then POWER_13 is exercised by Baird's sub-
mission of the bid, creating POWER_14 of the Highway Department.
After that Gimbel's POWER_4 is exercised to create a conditional rev-
ocation of POWER_3, i.e., CLR_5, whose c5 is fulfilled by the arrival of
the telegram to terminate Baird's POWER of acceptance, LR_3. How-
ever, POWER_3 is recreated by the Highway Department's exercise of
POWER_14 with its acceptance of Baird's bid. By accepting Gimbel's
offer, Baird exercises POWER_3 to create CLR_6 and wind up with
Gimbel having a remedial DUTY to pay damages.
This result was still unpalatable to Judge Hand, his justification
for rejecting the offer-for-an-option argument pictured below in Fig-
ure 6 was in the following terms:
Nor can the offer be regarded as an option, giving the plaintiff the
right [i.e., POWER] seasonably to accept the linoleum at the quoted
prices if its bid was accepted, but not binding it to take and pay, if it
could get a better bargain elsewhere. There is not the least reason
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Figure 6. LEGAL RELATIONS Analysis of Argument of Offer for an Option
Changes In Legal States ofAffairs
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to suppose that the defendant meant to subject itself to such a one-
sided obligation.
20
In American contract law it is dear in terms of LEGAL RELA-
TIONS that subcontractors like Gimbel have POWERS to make all
four offers above: POWERIA, POWERIB, POWERIC, and
POWERID. If Gimbel had clearly specified so in the letter, it could
have exercised any one of the four of its choices. The fundamental
question of this case in LR terms is just which POWER is it appropri-
ate to treat the letter as exercising, given that it does not expressly
specify just which one is intended. The choice of which is most appro-
priate is a policy choice between (1) the avoidance of allowing the
beating down of subcontractors' prices and (2) safeguarding general
contractors' reliance on prices quoted in making bids. Judge Hand
picks POWERIA, giving preference by his choice to the avoidance of
price-beating-down. 21 The results of this choice leave general contrac-
tors in the unhappy state of having relied upon submissions by sub-
contractors in preparing the amounts of their bids, only to discover
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enforceable. Although this choice may to some extent forestall post-
award shopping by awardees among subcontractors to try to beat
down subcontractors' prices, it leaves general contractors unpro-
tected, unless the subcontractor's offer explicitly provides some
equivalent of nonrevocability upon the general contractor's making
its bid.
Since 1986 the State of California has legislatively protected both
parties to such agreements and safeguarded its own interest as well by
(1) requiring general contractors to submit a list of subcontractors
who will perform more than one-half of one percent worth of the total
bid of the general contractor,22 and (2) requiring that the work will
be done by those subcontractors specified by the awardee.23 In that
context, a subcontractor is locked in when the bid is made by the
awardee, and upon receiving the award the awardee is bound to use
the services of the subcontractors listed. A scheme similar to this Cali-
fornia legislative remedy is set forth in Figure 7 with respect to Baird; it
differs in that the general contractor's final DUTY to use the services
of the subcontractor is to the subcontractor, while in the California
approach that DUTY is to the awarding authority. The suggested
manner of dealing with the general contractor-subcontractor
problems is pictured below in Figure 7.
Gimbel's sending the letter (b) is an exercise of POWERlE, cre-
ating CLR_2E whose c2E condition is fulfilled upon receipt of the let-
ter (c) by Baird. That results in creating Baird's POWER_3 of
acceptance and POWER_15, along with Gimbel's POWER_4 of condi-
tional revocation, which was exercised by Gimbel's sending the tele-
gram withdrawing the offer (d), creating CRL_5. Baird's submitting a
bid to the highway department (e) based on Gimbel's offer and in-
cluding Gimbel as a listed subcontractor exercises his POWER_15 to
terminate CRL_5 and creates the Highway Department's POWER_16.
The arrival of Gimbel's telegram withdrawing the offer (f) does not
have any legal effect, since CRL_5 has been terminated. The Highway
Department's acceptance of Baird's bid (g) exercises its POWER_16,
creating Baird's POWER_17 and converting Baird's DISCRETION-
ARY POWER_3 into an OBLIGATORY POWER_3 that MUST be exer-
cised. When Baird formally accepts Gimbel's offer (i), his
o_POWER_3 of acceptance is still intact and is thereby exercised, cre-
ating CRL.6. That same action also exercises Baird's POWER_17 and
thereby creates CRL_18. When time for performance arrives (k), the
22 See CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 4104 (West Supp. 1998).
23 See id. § 4107; see also id. § 4101 (containing the legislature's findings concern-
ing the effects of bid shopping and bid peddling).
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Figure 7. LEGAL RELATIONS Analysis of the California Legislative Remedy
Changes in Legal States of Affairs
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conditions c6 and c18 are fulfilled, thereby creating (1) Gimbel's
DUTY_7 to deliver the linoleum to Baird, and also (2) Baird's recipro-
cal DUTY19 to pay Gimbel the quoted price for it along with (3) a
POWER_20 of Gimbel to violate his DUTY_7 by refusing to deliver the
linoleum at the quoted price (1) and thereby create his DUTX_8 to pay
Baird damages and terminate Baird's DUTY_19 to pay for the
linoleum.
Does it require brilliant insight to devise a legislative remedy like
California's to the dilemma of being compelled to sacrifice the legiti-
mate commercial interests of either the generals or the subs in the
kind of bidding situations illustrated by Baird v. Gimbel-as Judge
Hand apparently felt forced to do? The contention here is that for
analysts fluent in the LEGAL RELATIONS, who will be able to form
such LR pictures readily, it will be much easier to deal in exceptionally
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competent ways with such subtle problems than it will be for those
who do not have such fluency. Quality of thought is enhanced by
command of precise and complete analytic tools, and the language in
which thought is conducted has profound influence.
Consider whether counsel for Baird, if they had been able to con-
struct Figure 7 after considering the risks of the alternatives portrayed
by Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6, might not have advised Baird (1) to include
the names and prices of the subcontractors in the bid submitted, and
(2) to declare his intention to be bound to use the services of the
subcontractors listed at the prices specified? Might Baird have fared
better with Judge Hand and his colleagues if Baird had done so?
Consider whether Judge Hand, if he had access to Figures 3
through 7, might have volunteered the kind of advice evident from
Figure 7 in the manner that the CIA and the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals did in Larson-even while continuing to decide the case ex-
actly as before? Would the wheels of commerce have rolled more
smoothly in the final two-thirds of the twentieth century, if Judge
Hand had tendered such guidance?
This LR analysis of the decision and arguments in Baird is delivery
on the expectations generated in the introduction section about 3(b)
and 4. My suggestion is that the pictorial lean briefs such as Figures 1
through 7 can be powerful analytic tools, not only for law students,
but also for judges and practicing attorneys. And it would not require
much imagination to sketch their usefulness to legal scholars and
other toilers in the legal vineyards, as well.
V. CONCLUSION
As increasing numbers of workers in the legal domain become
fluent in the comprehensive and precisely-defined LEGAL RELA-
TIONS language, the effects upon legal discourse and legal literature
will unfold in step with the increasing fluency. The Internet is an ex-
traordinary means for accelerating the pace at which those interested
can become articulate in LRL. My colleague, Charles Saxon, and I are
putting up a series of puzzles and games on LRL and other fundamen-
tal reasoning skills to facilitate the process. 24 The series of illustra-
tions of the usefulness of LRL in coping with problems in the
expression and interpretation of the logical structure of legal docu-
ments is intended as a stimulant to motivate law students, practicing
lawyers, drafters, judges, legal scholars, and other miners of the intel-
lectual lode of the law to have the kind of look at LRL that will equip




them to seriously try to use it on some of their toughest problems.
The illustrations are also, hopefully, a welcome reminder to those who
know the exhilaration of pursuing precise ideas to ever higher levels
of abstraction that their labors have important practical significance.
Deontic logicians can point proudly to what their craft can do to assist
those in other fields, if the law is at all representative in this respect.
The LEGAL RELATIONS Language would not have seen birth but for
the tools and techniques provided by logicians, deontic and otherwise,
but now in the early phases of its evolution the LEGAL RELATIONS
Language is designed to provide:
* For law students, pictorial representations of LRL analysis of
appellate court opinions to deepen understanding;
* For practicing lawyers, more comprehensive and precise tools
for structurally interpreting important legal documents, such as their
own professional liability insurance policies;
* For rules drafters, a means of checking the ambiguity in the
logical structure of regulations, statutes, constitutions, corporate by-
laws, contracts, and other sets of legal rules to assure that such ambi-
guity is deliberate, rather than inadvertent;
a For appellate court judges, to craft written opinions that pre-
cisely and completely express the structure, scope, and limits of their
decisions;
a For legal scholars, a tool for the more precise and comprehen-
sive analysis and expression of legal doctrine for the benefit of stu-
dents and others whom they serve;
* Finally, for those other workers in law who are seeking to build
computer systems to assist the legal profession, a representational lan-
guage for expert and other systems whose expressive power covers all
of legal discourse.
But deontic and other logicians should stay with those of us in law
who are interested in these matters. If the past is any indication, we
will need your help even more in the twenty-first century.
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APPENDIX: THE (CURRENT) LEGAL RELATIONS LANGUAGE
The 43 Structural Definitions of the LEGAL RELATIONS Language
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"a AND b." means
"The state of affairs described by sentencea is so, and the state of
affairs described by sentenceb is so."
BUT OTHERWISE
"IF a THEN b BUT OTHERWISE c." means
"IF a THEN b, AND IF NEG a THEN c."
CONDITIONAL DISABILITY
"pl has CONDITIONAL DISABILITY to create LEGAL_RELA-
TIONLR." means
"pl has POWER to create legal LEGALRELATIONLR, AND there is
an evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
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2. IF evente occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN pl's DISABILITY to create
LEGALRELATIONLR is created (which is another way of
saying that pl's POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR is
terminated) ."
CONDITIONAL DUTY
"pl has a CONDITIONAL DUTY to p2 do s." means
"pl has a PRIVILEGE with respect to p2 to do NEG s, AND there is an
evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF evente occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN pl's DUTY to p2 do s is cre-
ated (which is another way of saying that pl's PRIVILEGE with
respect to p2 to do NEG s is terminated)."
CONDITIONAL IMMUNITY
"LEGAL RELATION LR has CONDITIONAL IMMUNITY from be-
ing created by pl." means
"LEGALRELATIONLR has LIABILITY of being created by pl, AND
there is an evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF evente occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN LEGALRELATION_LR's
IMMUNITY from being created by pl (which is another way of
saying that LEGALRELATION_LR's LIABILITY of being cre-
ated by pl is terminated)."
CONDITIONAL LEGAL REIATIONS
"There is a CONDITIONALLEGALRELATIONCLR that
LEGALRELATION_LR will be created by the fulfillment of condi-
fionc." means
"1. LR is NOT so, AND
2. there is an evente that the legal system will treat as fulfilling con-
ditionc, AND
3. it is naturally possible for e to occur, AND
4. IF e occurs, THEN c is treated by the legal system as fulfilled, AND
5. IF c is fulfilled, THEN LR is created, AND CLR is terminated."
Thus, the following is so:
IF 1. personpl has a CONDITIONAL RIGHT upon fulfill-
ment of conditionc that personp2 bring about the
state-of affairss, AND
2. evente occurs, AND
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3. IF e occurs, THEN c is treated by the legal system to be
fulfilled,
THEN 4. c is fulfilled, AND
5. pl's RIGHT that p2 bring about s is created, AND
6. pl's CONDITIONAL RIGHT that p2 bring about s is
terminated.
CONDITIONAL LIABILITY
"LEGALRELATIONLR has CONDITIONAL LIABILITY of being
created by pl." means
"p1 has CONDITIONAL POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR."
which, in turn, means
"pl lacks POWER to create legal LEGALRELATION_LR, AND there
is an evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF event-e occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN pl's POWER to create
LEGALRELATIONLR is created (which is another way of
saying that LEGALRELATIONLR's LIABILITY is created)."
CONDITIONAL NORIGHT
"p1 has a CONDITIONAL NORIGHT that p2 do s." means
"pl has a RIGHT that p2 do s, AND there is an evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF evente occurs, THEN condition c is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN pl's NO-RIGHT that p2 do s
is created (which is another way of saying that pl's RIGHT
that p2 do s is terminated)."
CONDITIONAL POWER
"pl has CONDITIONAL POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR."
means
"pl lacks POWER to create legal LEGALRELATIONLR, AND there
is an evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF evente occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN pl's POWER to create
LEGALRELATIONLR is created."
CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE
"pl has a CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE with respect to p2 to do s."
means
"p2 has a CONDITIONAL NORIGHT that pl do NEG s."
which, in turn, means
"p2 has a RIGHT that pl do NEG s, AND there is an event-e such that
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1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF evente occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN p2's NORIGHT that pl do
NEG s is created (which is another way of saying that p2's
RIGHT that pl do NEG s is terminated, which in turn is an-
other way of saying that pl's PRIVILEGE with respect to p2 to
do s is created)."
CONDITIONAL RIGHT
"pl has a CONDITIONAL RIGHT that p2 do s.' means
"p2 has a CONDITIONAL DUTY to pl to do s."
which, in turn, means
"p2 has a PRIVILEGE with respect to pl to do NEG s, AND there is an
evente such that
1. it is naturally possible for evente to occur, AND
2. IF evente occurs, THEN conditionc is fulfilled, AND
3. IF conditionc is fulfilled, THEN pl's DUTY to p2 do s is cre-
ated (which is another way of saying that p2's PRIVILEGE with
respect to pl to do NEG s is terminated, which in turn is an-
other way of saying that pl's RIGHT that p2 do s is created)."
DISABIEITI
"pl has DISABILITY to create LEGALRELATIONLR" means
"pl lacks POWER to create LEGALRELATION_LR."
which, in turn, means that
"1. LEGALRELATIONLR is already so, OR
2. A. it is naturally possible for state-of affairss to be DONE-BYpl,
AND
B. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF s is DONE-BY pl, THEN
LEGALRELATIONLR is created."
DISCRETION
"pl has DISCRETION with respect to p2 as to whether or not to do s."
means
"pl has a PRIVILEGE with respect to p2 to do s, AND pl has a PRIVI-
LEGE with respect to p2 to do NEG s."
DISCRETIONARY POWER
"Person_p1 has DISCRETIONARY POWER to create
LEGALRELATION_LR." means
"Personpl has POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR and MAY,
BUT NEED NOT, exercise that POWER."
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DONEBY
"State of affairss is DONEBY person-p." means
"person-p sees to it that state-of affairss is so."
DONEFOR
"State of affairss is DONEFOR person-p." means
"somebody sees to it that with respect to personp, state-of affairss is
so.
DUTY
"pl has a DUTY to p2 to do s." means
"IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT s be done by pl for p2."
which in turn means operationally in terms of how the legal sys-
tem will treat the matter
"IF 1. IT IS NOT SO THAT pl does s for p2,
THEN 2. pl has violated her DUTY to p2, AND
3. IF p2 seeks remedy in the legal system by litigating,
THEN the legal system will provide a remedy to pl
withrespect to p2."
FORBIDDEN
"IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT a." means
"IF 1. the state of affairs described by sentencea is so,
THEN 2. there is a violation, AND
3. the legal system will provide a remedy with respect to
the violator."
FORBIDDEN POWER
"Personpl has FORBIDDEN POWER to create LEGALRELA-
TIONLR." means
"Personpl has POWER to creat LEGALRELATIONLR, but MUST
NOT exercise that POWER."
IF
"s IF a." means
"IF a THEN s."
IF... THEN
"IF a THEN s." means
"1. If the state of affairs described by sentencea is so then the state
of affairs described by sentence-s is so, AND
2. if the state of affairs described by sentencea is not so, then noth-
ing is being said about whether or not the state of affairs described
by sentence-s is so."
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IF AND ONLY IF
"s IF AND ONLY IF a." means
"IF a THEN s, AND IF NEG a THEN NEG s."
ThMUNrYY
"LEGALRELATIONLR has IMMUNITY of being created by pl."
means
"pl lacks POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR."
which, in turn, means that
"1) LEGALRELATIONLR is already so, OR
2) A. it is naturally possible for pl to do s, AND
B. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF pl does s, THEN
LEGALRELATIONLR is created."
IT IS NOT SO THAT
"IT IS NOT SO THAT a." means
"It is not so that the state of affairs described by sentencea is so."
LEGAL RELATION
LEGAL RELATION is defined contextually in the following recursive
definition.
1. DUTY-type propositions are LEGAL RELATIONS.
2. A. Equivalents and NEGATIONS of LEGAL RELATIONS are
LEGAL RELATIONS.
B. IF LR is a LEGAL RELATION and POWER(D2(x,p),LR) is a
POWER-type proposition that indicates that LR will be created
when personp exercises that POWER, THEN
POWER(D2(x,p),LR) is a LEGAL RELATION.
C. IF LR is a LEGAL RELATION and CONDITIONAL(c,LR) is a
proposition that indicates that LR will be created upon fulfill-
ment of some specified condition_c, THEN CONDI-
TIONAL(c,LR) is a LEGAL RELATION.
3. IF a proposition is NOT a LEGAL RELATION by virtue of (1) or
(2), THEN it is NOT a LEGAL RELATION.
By this definition of LEGAL RELATION, statements involving any
of the defined structural terms below will express LEGAL
RELATIONS:
DUTY CONDITIONAL DUTY POWER CONDMONAL POWER
RIGHT CONDITIONAL RIGHT LIABILITY CONDITIONAL LIABILITY
NOJUGHT CONDITIONALNo JUGHT DISABILITY CONDITIONALDISABILITY
PRIVILEGE CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE IMMUNITY CONDITIONALMMUNIY
DISCRETION DISCRETIONARY POWER FORBIDDEN POWER OBLIGATORY POWER
In other words, all Modified Hohfeldian LEGAL RELATIONS (de-
rived from Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions) and all Ex-
tended Hohfeldian LEGAL RELATIONS are LEGAL RELATIONS.
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There is an important additional consideration that needs to be men-
tioned about the above definition of LEGAL RELATIONS. This cur-
rent definition of LEGAL RELATIONS may need to be extended to
include elliptical versions of the above LEGAL RELATIONS by state-
ments involving (1) Deontic Operators or (2) WithinSentence Con-
nectives defined in terms of such Deontic Operators (such as 'MUST'
and 'MAY). These elliptical statements typically omit expressing
some or all of the persons involved in the LEGAL RELATION.
Alternatively, the above recursive definition of LEGAL RELA-
TIONS can be left to stand as is and still be the complete definition of
LEGAL RELATIONS, and then, treat the statements involving Deon-
tic Operators and WithinSentence Connectives as elliptical state-
ments of LEGAL RELATIONS that omit express mention of some or
all of the persons involved in the LEGAL RELATION. This second
alternative seems the better way to go. If anyone else has any thoughts
on this, please furnish feedback at: http://thinkers.law.umich.edu/
files.
LIABILITY
"LEGALRELATIONLR has LIABILITY of being created by pl."
means
"pl has POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR"."
which, in turn, means
1. "LEGALRELATIONLR is NOT so, AND
2. it is naturally possible for state-of affairss to be DONE-BY pl,
AND
3. IF s is DONEBY pl, THEN LEGAL_ RELATIONLR is created."
MAY
"al MAY a2." means
"IT IS PERMITTED THAT al a2." (where "al" concatenated with "a2"
is a sentence)
which, in turn, means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT al a2."
which, in turn, means that
"1. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tenceala2 is so, THEN 2. there is a violation, AND
2. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tenceala2 is so, the legal system will provide a remedy with re-
spect to the alleged violator."
MAY BUT NEED NOT
"al MAY BUT NEED NOT a2." means
"al MAY a2, AND al NEED NOT a2."
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(where "al" concatenated with "a2" is a sentence, AND "al" concate-
nated with "NOT a2" is a sentence)
which, in turn, means
"IT IS PERMITTED THAT al a2, AND IT IS PERMITTED THAT al
NOT a2."
which, in turn, means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT al a2, AND IT IS
NOT SO THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT al NOT a2."
which, in turn, means that
"WHETHER OR NOT the state of affairs described by sentenceala2
is so,
1. IT IS NOT SO THAT there is a violation, AND
2. IT IS NOT SO THAT the legal system will provide a remedy
with respect to the alleged violator."
MUST
"al MUST a2." means
"IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT al a2." (where "al" concatenated with
"a2" is a sentence)
which, in turn, means
"IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT NEG al a2."
which, in turn, means
"IF 1. the state of affairs described by sentenceala2 is NOT
so,
THEN 2. there is a violation, AND
3. the legal system will provide a remedy with respect to
the violator."
MUST NOT
"al MUST NOT a2." means
"IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT al NOT a2." (where "al" concatenated
with "NOT a2" is a sentence)
which, in turn, means
"IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT al a2."
which, in turn, means
"IF the state of affairs described by sentenceal_a2 is so, THEN (1)
there is a violation, AND (2) the legal system will provide a remedy
with respect to the violator."
NEED NOT
"al NEED NOT a2." means
"IT IS PERMITTED THAT al NOT a2." (where "al" concatenated
with "NOT a2" is a sentence)
which, in turn, means
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"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT al NOT a2."
which, in turn, means that
"1. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tence alNOT-a2 is so, THEN there is a violation, AND
2. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tence alNOT-a2 is so, THEN the legal system will provide a
remedy with respect to the violator."
NEG
"NEG a." means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT a."
NONOBLIGATORY
"IT IS NONOBLIGATORY THAT a." means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT a."
which, in turn, means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT NEG a."
which, in turn, means
"1. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tencea is NOT so, THEN there is a violation, AND
2. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tencea is NOT so, THEN the legal system will provide a remedy
with respect to the violator."
NORIGHT
"pl has a NORIGHT that p2 do s." means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT p2 has a DUTY to pl to do s."
which in turn means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT s be done by p2 for
pl."
which in turn means operationally in terms of how the legal sys-
tem will treat the matter
"IF 1. p 2 does s with respect to pl,
THEN 2. p 2 has NOT violated any DUTY to pl, AND
3. IF pl seeks remedy in the legal system by litigating,
THEN the legal system will NOT provide a remedy to
pl with respect to p2."
NOT
The sentence, "al is NOT a2." means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT the state of affairs described by sentence_(al is
a2) is so."
For example, the sentence, "The defendant is NOT guilty." im-




However, although, the sentence, "The defendant was found
NOT guilty." implies the sentence, "IT IS NOT SO THAT the defend-
ant was found guilty." the reverse is NOT so. IT IS NOT THE CASE
THAT the sentence, "IT IS NOT SO THAT the defendant was found
guilty." implies the sentence, "The defendant was found NOT guilty."
(e.g., a hung jury)
Thus, it is important to notice that that the presence of the word
"is" immediately preceding the word "NOT" in this contextual defini-
tion is significant, because the sentence, "al NOT a2." (Without the
"is") does NOT always imply the sentence "IT IS NOT SO THAT the
state of affairs described by sentence_(al a2) is so." Also, IT IS NOT
SO THAT "al NOT a2." is always implied by "IT IS NOT SO THAT
the state of affairs described by the sentence_(al a2) is so."
For example, IT IS NOT SO THAT 'Jones is PERMITTED to
NOT provide for the education of her 21-year old children." implies
the sentence, IT IS NOT SO THAT Jones is PERMITTED to provide
for the education of her 21-year old children. Further, an example in
which the first is NOT implied by the second is that IT IS NOT SO
THAT 'Jones MUST NOT provide for the education of her 21-year
old children." is implied by "IT IS NOT SO THAT Jones MUST pro-
vide for the education of her 21-year old children."
OBLIGATORY
"IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT a." means
"IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT NEG a."
which, in turn, means
"IF the state of affairs described by sentencea is NOT so, THEN (1)
there is a violation, AND (2) the legal system will provide a remedy
with respect to the violator."
OBLIGATORY POWER
"Person...pl has OBLIGATORY POWER to create LEGALRELA-
TIONLR." means
"Person-pl has POWER to creat LEGALRELATIONLR and MUST
exercise that POWER."
OR
"a OR b." means
"The state of affairs described by sentencea is so, or the state of af-
fairs described by sentenceb is so, or both are so."
PMMITTM
"IT IS PERMITTED THAT a." means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS FORBIDDEN THAT a."
which, in turn, means that
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"1. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tence-a is so, THEN there is a violation, AND
2. IT IS NOT SO THAT IF the state of affairs described by sen-
tencea is so, the legal system will provide a remedy with respect to
the violator."
POWER
"Person.p has POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR." means
"1. LEGALRELATIONLR is NOT so, AND
2. there is some state-of affairss such that
A. it is naturally possible for s to be DONEBY person p, AND
B. IF s is DONE-BY personp, THEN
1. the legal system will treat that as an exercise of POWER by
person-p to create LEGALRELATIONLR, AND
2. LEGALRELATIONLR is created, AND (C) person-p's
POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR is terminated."
Thus, the following is so:
IF 1. person-p has POWER to create LEGALRELA-
TIONLR, AND
2. stateof affairss is DONE-BY personp, AND
3. the legal systems treatss being DONE-BY p as being an
exercise of her POWER to create LEGALRELA-
TIONLR
THEN 4. p has exercised her POWER to create LEGALRELA-
TIONLR, AND
5. LEGAL_ RELATIONLR is created, AND
6. p's POWER to create LEGALRELATIONLR is termi-
nated.
PRIVILEGE
"pl has a PRIVILEGE with respect to p2 to do s." means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT pl has a DUTY to p2 to do NEG s."
which in turn means
"IT IS NOT SO THAT IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT NEG s be done by
pl for p2."
which in turn means operationally in terms of how the legal sys-
tem will treat the matter
"IF 1. pl does s with respect to p2,
THEN 2. IT IS NOT SO THAT pl has violated a DUTY to p2,
AND
3. IF p2 seeks remedy in the legal system by litigating,
THEN IT IS NOT SO THAT the legal system will pro-




"pl has a RIGHT that p2 do s." means
"p2 has a DUTY to pl to do s."
which in turn means
"IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT s be done by p2 for pl."
which in turn means operationally in terms of how the legal sys-
tem will treat the matter
"IF 1. IT IS NOT SO THAT p2 does s for pl,
THEN 2. p 2 has violated her DUTY to pl, AND
3. IF p1 seeks remedy in the legal system by litigating,
THEN the legal system will provide a remedy to pl
withrespect to p2."
UNCONDITIONAL LEGAL RELATION
"x is an UNCONDITIONAL LEGAL RELATION" means
"1. x is a LEGAL RELATION whose main operator is 'OBLIGATORY
or its NEGATION, OR
2. X is a LEGAL RELATION equivalent to such a LEGAL
RELATION."
Four of the five ways of expressing UNCONDITIONAL LEGAL RELA-
TIONS involve the following four legal operators: RIGHT, DUTY,
NORIGHT, and PRIVILEGE. Examples are:
1. RIGHT(s,pl,p2) =ab RIGHT(state of affairs-s, person_l,
person.2).
Person_2 has a RIGHT that person_1 see to it that
state of affairss is so, that is, that state-of affairss is DONEBY
personil.
2. DUTY(s,p2,pl) =ab DUTY(state of_affairss, person2, personAl).
Person_1 has a DUTY to person_2 to see to it that stateofaffairs_s
is so, that is, that state-of affairss is DONEBY person-l.
3. PRIVILEGE(NEG(s),p2,pl) =ab PRIVILEGE(stateof_affairs_
NEG(s), person_2,personj1).
Person_1 has a PRIVILEGE with respect to person_2 to see to it
that the state-of affairsNEG(s) is so, that is, that
state-of affairsNEG(s) is DONEBY person-l.
4. NORIGHT(s,pl,p2) =ab NO_RIGHT(state of affairs-s, per-
sonjl, person_2).
Person_2 has a NORIGHT that person_2 see to it that
state-of affairss is so, that is, that state-of affairss is DONEBY
person2.
The first two of these modified LEGAL RELATIONS and the NEGA-
TIONS of the last two, together with a fifth OBLIGATORY action
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statement, O(D2(D4(s,p2),pl)) are referred to as the DUTYset of
LEGAL RELATIONS.
5. D2(D4(s,p2),pl) =ab OBLIGATORY(DONEBY(DONEFOR
(state-of affairs-s, person_2),person_2)).
IT IS OBLIGATORY THAT state-of affairss be DONEFOR per-
son p2 be DONEBY person-pl.
There are the following equivalence relations among the five mem-
bers of the DUIY set:
DUTY(s,p2,pl) r-- represents




There is a corresponding set of LEGAL RELATIONS consisting of the
NEGATIONS of the five above called the PRIVILEGEset. They, of
course, are also equivalent to each other.
NEG(DUTY(s,p2,p 1))
NEG(RIGHT(s,pl,p2))
PRIVILEGE(NEG(s),p2,p I)
NO_RIGHT(s,pl,p2)
NEG(O(D2(D4(s,p2),p1)))
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